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Abstract
Consider an electricity market populated by competitive agents using thermal
generating units. Such generation involves the emission of pollutants, on which a
regulator might impose constraints. Transmission capacities for sending energy may
naturally be restricted by the grid facilities. Both pollution standards and trans-
mission capacities can impose several constraints upon the joint strategy space of
the agents. We propose a coupled constraints equilibrium as a solution to the reg-
ulator’s problem of avoiding both congestion and excessive pollution. Using the
coupled constraints’ Lagrange multipliers as taxation coeﬃcients the regulator can
compel the agents to obey the multiple constraints. However, for this modiﬁcation
of the players’ payoﬀs to induce the required behaviour a coupled constraints equi-
librium needs to exist and must also be unique. A three-node market example with
a dc model of the transmission line constraints described in [8] and [2] possesses
these properties. We extend it here to utilise a two-period load duration curve
and, in result, obtain a two-period game. The implications of the game solutions
obtained for several weights, which the regulator can use to vary the level of gener-
ators’ responsibilities for the constraints’ satisfaction, for consumer and producer
surpluses will be discussed.
Keywords: Coupled constraints; generalised Nash equilibrium; electricity produc-
tion; electricity transmission
JEL: C6, C7, D7
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of pollution standards on electricity
generators already subjected to grid facility restrictions.1 We consider an electricity
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market populated by competitive agents using thermal generating units. Such
generation emits pollutants, on which a regulator might wish to impose constraints.
Transmission capacity for sending energy may naturally be restricted by the grid
facilities. Both pollution standards and transmission capacity can be deﬁned as
constraints upon the joint strategy space of the agents.
We notice that the setup of the problem in this paper is similar to that discussed
in [3]. Here, however, we utilise a two-period load duration curve and allow for
imposition of the environmental constraints on the two-period joint emissions, while
the analysis in [3] was conﬁned to one period. We also make explicit in this paper the
relationship between a solution to the problem and the weights, which the regulator
may use to distribute the responsibility for the joint constraints’ satisfaction, among
the generators and/or periods, see Deﬁnition 3.1.
We follow [19], [13], [2], [10], and also [3], and use a coupled constraints equilib-
rium as a solution concept for the discussed problem. Under this solution concept
the regulator can compute (for suﬃciently concave games) the generators’ outputs
that are both unilaterally non-improvable (Nash) and which satisfy the constraints
imposed on the joint strategy space.
If the regulator can impose penalties on the generators for violation of the
joint constraints then the game becomes “decoupled”, once the players incorporate
the penalties in their payoﬀ functions. If so, the players implement the coupled
constraints equilibrium to avoid ﬁnes associated with both congestion and excessive
pollution. These penalties that prevent excessive generation are computed using
the coupled constraints Lagrange multipliers. However, for this modiﬁcation of the
players’ payoﬀs to induce the required behaviour, a coupled constraints equilibrium
needs to exist and be unique for a given distribution of the responsibilities for
the joint constraints satisfaction, among the generators and periods. A three-
node bilateral market example with a dc model of the transmission line constraints
(described in [2]) possesses these properties and will be used in this paper to discuss
and explain the behaviour of agents subjected to coupled constraints.
The analysis conducted in this paper should be particularly useful to regional
governments interested in assessing the impact of environmental regulation on elec-
tricity generation. The case study considered shows signiﬁcant market distortion
and re-allocation of surplus as a result of the imposition of a pollution constraint.
We also show that by altering the degrees of responsibility for the joint constraints
satisfaction, among the generators and periods, the regulator may help to “save”
the consumer surplus.
For the results we use NIRA, which is a piece of software designed to min-
maximise the Nikaido-Isoda function and thus compute a coupled constraints equi-
librium (see [14]). We also notice that a coupled constraints equilibrium could be
obtained2 as a solution to a quasi-variational inequality3 (see [9], [17]) or gradient
pseudo-norm minimisation (see [19], [5], [6]).
2We refer to [11] for a review on numerical solutions to coupled-constraint equilibria.
3Some comparisons between NIRA and a method suitable for quasi-variational problems, which
consists of a sequence of solutions of linear complementarity problems, are provided in [15]. While
both methods deliver the same solution, NIRA performs less eﬃciently on the chosen (linear)
example. As was observed in [22], NIRA is general being suitable for non-smooth games and can
be outperformed when games are “smooth”.
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What follows is a brief outline of what this paper contains. In section 2 a model
of a bilateral electricity market game is presented. Section 3 brieﬂy explains the
idea of a coupled constraints equilibrium and the algorithm that will be used to
ﬁnd it. Sections 4, 5 and 6 present the parameters of the case study and the results
of our analysis. In section 7 an economic interpretation is given to the results. The
concluding remarks summarise our ﬁndings.
2 The model
2.1 A game with constraints
An electricity market is a system for eﬀecting the purchase and sale of electricity,
where the interaction between supply and demand sets the market price. Transac-
tions are typically cleared and settled by the market operator or by a special-purpose
independent entity charged exclusively with that function. If the oﬀers by the gen-
erators and the demand bids are matched bilaterally then the market is known as
bilateral. We focus on this type of electricity market in this paper.
Transmission systems connect generators and consumer loads in an electricity
network and they are operated to allow for continuity of supply. Transmission
networks can experience bottlenecks; in addition, the authorities usually establish
pollution limits on the generators’ emissions. These constraints limit the production
of the generators and, consequently, their proﬁts. In the following subsections we
explain how the generators optimise their production and how the network and
environmental constraints aﬀect their proﬁts in a coupled constraints game.
2.2 Generator’s problem
We assume no arbitrage (existence of marketers that can buy and sell power from
producers and consumers) and a linear dc representation of the network.4
Each generator is maximising the sum of payoﬀs over a horizon T divided into
periods of length ∆t. The period length corresponds to the time within which the
demand for electricity is considered constant according to the load duration curve5.
Each company f = 1, . . . , F owns several generating units g = 1, . . . , G dis-
tributed throughout the network composed of nodes i, j = 1, . . . , N . The cost of
running unit g that belongs to company f , placed at node i for period ∆t and
whose power in this period is P tfgi MW, is C(P
t
fgi)∆
t. The maximum capacity of
generator is P fgi.
Consumers buy qti MWh of energy at node i in period t. At each node, linear
demand functions are assumed to be of the form pti(σ
t
i) = a
t
i −
ati
bti
σti where σ
t
i is the
hourly demand in period t deﬁned as σti = q
t
i/∆
t measured in MW (we will later
4See [4] for technical details.
5The load duration curve is a curve of loads, plotted in a descending order of magnitude,
against the time intervals for a speciﬁed period. Load duration curves are proﬁles of system
demand that can be drawn for speciﬁed periods of time (e.g., daily, monthly, yearly)
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refer to σti as demand for power). Price p
t
i(σ
t
i) is expressed in $/MWh and a
t
i and b
t
i
are the price and power intercepts for (inverse) demand law at node i, respectively.
Energy stfj MWh is sold by company f to consumers at node j in period t.
Market clearing is such that the condition
∑
f s
t
fj = q
t
j holds. Also, an energy
balance per period is imposed on each company:
∑
i,g P
t
fgi∆
t =
∑
j s
t
fj . Given that
(and remembering that demand is constant within ∆t), each company f chooses
generation P tfgi and sales s
t
fi to maximise proﬁt ($), which is equal to revenue minus
generation costs:
max
∑
j,t
[
atj −
atj
btj
(
σtfj +
∑
k =f
σtkj
)]
stfj −
∑
i,g,t
C(P tfgi)∆
t (1)
subject to:
0 ≤ P tfgi ≤ P fgi, ∀ nodes i, generators g, periods t∑
j s
t
fj =
∑
i,g P
t
fgi∆
t, for each ﬁrm f, ∀ periods t∑
f s
t
fj = q
t
j, for each node j, ∀ periods t
⎫⎬
⎭ (2)
We are interested in a non-cooperative solution to the game at hand. This means
that we are looking for a distribution of generation and corresponding payoﬀs such
that no player can improve his own payoﬀ by a unilateral action. Bearing in mind
that the solution is required to satisfy constraints, it will need to be understood
as a “generalised” Nash-Cournot equilibrium as it is called in [17], or a coupled
constraints equilibrium as we call it. We explain this concept in section 3.
Notice that problem (1), (2) is time-decomposable because the generators cannot
accumulate power across the periods. However, a generator problem would not
enjoy this feature if an inter-temporal constraint were imposed.
2.3 Transmission constraints
The generating units and the nodes are connected by transmission lines, forming a
network. The lines provide a path to transmit the power produced by the generators
to the nodes for consumption. The power ﬂowing through the lines is subject to
thermal line limits. These limits are set in both directions of the ﬂow in a line,
which is why the absolute value is used in equation (3) below. To represent the
topology of the network in this game it is necessary to select a node as the reference
node. This is called the “slack” node or “swing” node (see [4] for details). The
following equation expresses the ﬂow going through the lines in period t as a linear
function of the power injected at the nodes; this is called the dc approximation of
the power ﬂow:
Pti→j ≡
[
Bd · AT · B−1
] ·Pt, with |Pti→j| ≤ Pi→j, 6 (3)
where the variables and parameters are as follows:
6Note that, throughout this paper, we use the notation |Pti→j | to denote a matrix with each
element being the absolute value of the corresponding element of Pti→j . It is not intended to
represent the norm of a vector.
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Pti→j is a column vector whose number of rows is equal to the number of lines
of the network. Each element represents the ﬂow through the line i − j in
period t, measured in MW.
Bd is the diagonal branch susceptance matrix, whose number of rows and
columns is equal to the number of lines in the network. The diagonal terms of
Bd are the susceptances of the lines (susceptance is the inverse of reactance).
The reactances are expressed in per-unit relative to the impedance base7
value.
A is the node-branch incidence matrix; its dimensions are the number of nodes
minus one (slack node) by the number of lines. The values of A are equal to
+1 if the line i− j starts at node i, and −1 if it ends at node j.8
B is the diagonal node-to-node susceptance matrix; its dimensions are equal
to the number of nodes minus one (slack node). The diagonal terms bii are
equal to the sum of the susceptances of the lines that are connected to node
i, and the terms bij are equal to the negative of the susceptances of the lines
that connect node i and node j.
Pt is a column vector whose dimension is equal to the number of nodes minus
one (the slack node). Its components are of the form (P tfgi − qti/∆t), repre-
senting the power in MW injected (generation minus demand) in each of the
nodes in period t, except for the slack node.
Pi→j is a column vector whose number of rows is equal to the number of lines
of the network. Each of its elements represents the thermal limit (maximum
active power that can ﬂow through a line) of a line in MW.
2.4 Pollution constraints
The thermal generation of electricity releases several contaminants into the atmo-
sphere. The overall goal of reducing the emission of pollutants has to be expressed
as a constraint for the overall production of all generating units. There are three
main types of emissions: CO2, SO2 and NOx. The general expression of the pollu-
tion constraint for emissions of type  is (see [18]):∑
h,t
∆t
[
αh + βhPh + γhP
2
h
] ≤ K ,  = 1, . . . L (4)
where L can denote the number of noxious substances, for which restrictions are
to be enforced or it may refer to the number of locations at which substance limits
need to be observed. ∆t is the duration in hours of period t of the load duration
curve and Ph is the power output of generating unit h. The unit will be the g-
th generator of ﬁrm f located at node i. However, for pollution generation and
its constraint, the location of h relative to monitor  is relevant. Coeﬃcients αh,
7The per − unit value of any quantity is deﬁned as the ratio of the quantity to its base value,
expressed as a decimal. See [20] for details.
8The indices here refer to the nodes rather than the matrix elements.
5
βh, and γh correspond to emissions discharged by unit h measured as pollution
at location  (“type” ). Amount K is the maximum allowed pollution of type 
during all periods, usually measured in lb or Ton.
In (4), we have chosen to restrict the maximum allowed pollution of type 
during all periods rather than per period, mainly to reﬂect the popular policy
of many governments to delimit the allowable pollution in annual i.e., all-period
terms. This introduces a dynamic aspect to the game: given a binding value of
K the ﬁrms will consider tradeoﬀs between generating power in one period against
generating it in another period so that the constraint is satisﬁed and their payoﬀs
are maximised.
Each term of the left hand side of expression (4) can be interpreted as a steady-
state solution to the partial diﬀerential equation describing the dispersion of pollu-
tion from a point source (see [1] for the integrated Gaussian puﬀ diﬀusion model).
In this paper, the coeﬃcients of (4) have been calibrated following [18]).
The above constraint reﬂects the regulator’s concern for substance  concen-
tration at a selected (representative) location. More constraints of type (4) could
be added to the problem formulation for more locations, at which the regulator
would want to enforce compliance. If needed, the constraints can be deﬁned as
limits per periods and/or per generator, should such limits be known and adequate
monitoring facilities exist.
3 Constrained equilibria
3.1 Coupled constraints equilibria
A coupled constraints equilibrium (CCE) is an extension of a standard Nash equi-
librium in which players’ strategy sets are allowed to depend upon other players’
strategies. Coupled constraints equilibria are also known as generalised Nash equi-
libria. The competition between electricity generating ﬁrms subject to constraints
described above in section 2 is an example of such a problem. Analytical solutions
to CCE problems are not normally possible so section 3.2 describes a numerical
method for solving some such problems.
Coupled constraints equilibria are particularly useful in a class of problems
where competing agents are subjected to regulation. Many electricity market and
environmental problems belong to this class. CCE allows modelling of a situation
in which the actions of one player condition how ‘big’ the actions of other players
can be. Constraints in which the actions of one player do not aﬀect the action space
of another (as in Nash equilibrium problems) are called uncoupled.
In our problem there are two such sets of coupled constraints: the line con-
straints and the environmental constraints. In both cases a limit is placed on a
measurable variable — the ﬂow of electricity through a particular line or the am-
bient pollution levels — and the actions of the players are constrained to jointly
satisfy these limits.
In these games the constraints are assumed to be such that the resulting col-
lective action set X is a closed convex subset of IRm. If Xf is player-f ’s action set,
X ⊆ X1×· · ·×XF is the collective action set (where X = X1×· · ·×XF represents
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the special case in which the constraints are uncoupled).
Consider the solution to this game represented by the collective action x∗ where
players’ payoﬀ functions, φf , are continuous in all players’ actions and concave in
their own action9. The Nash equilibrium can be written as
φf (x
∗) = max
x∈X
φf(yf |x∗) (5)
where yf |x∗ denotes a collection of actions where the fth agent “tries” yf while
the remaining agents continue to play the collective action x∗. Note that x∗ is a
column vector with elements xg, g = 1, 2, . . . , f − 1, f + 1, . . . , F . At x∗ no player
can improve his own payoﬀ through a unilateral change in his strategy so x∗ is a
Nash equilibrium point. If X is a closed and strictly convex set deﬁned through
coupled constraints (like (4)) then x∗ is a CCE.
3.2 NIRA
Games with coupled constraints rarely allow for an analytical solution and so numer-
ical methods must be employed. Here we use a method based on the Nikaido-Isoda
function and a relaxation algorithm (hence the name: NIRA).
3.2.1 The Nikaido-Isoda function
This function is a cornerstone of the NIRA technique for solving games for their
CCE. It transforms the complex process of solving a (constrained) game into a far
simpler (constrained) optimisation problem.
In the remainder of this section (i.e., section 3), we are indexing a player’s
action, payoﬀ, weight, etc. by the sole index f . If the players’ responsibilities are
distributed non-equally among periods t, then all these variables should be indexed
by f and t. We will do so in sections 4 and 5 where the game solutions are computed
and interpreted. Here, however, for clarity of notation and interpretations of the
Nikaido-Isoda function we use the single index.
Definition 3.1. Let φf be the payoﬀ function for player f , X a collective strategy
set as before and rf > 0 be a given weighting
10 of player f .The Nikaido-Isoda
function Ψ : X ×X → IR is deﬁned as
Ψ(x,y) =
F∑
f=1
rf [φf(yf |x)− φf(x)] (6)
Result 3.1. See [21].
Ψ(x,x) ≡ 0 x ∈ X. (7)
9In our study, the payoﬀ function φf (·) corresponds to the expression under the maximisation
operator in (1).
10The weights can be viewed as a political instrument the regulator might use to distribute
the responsibility for the joint constraints’ satisfaction, among the generators and periods. If the
players’ responsibilities are distributed in periods t non-equally, then the weights, actions, payoﬀs
etc. become rtf , x
t
f , φ
t
f , respectively.
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Each summand from the Nikaido-Isoda function can be thought of as the im-
provement in payoﬀ a player will receive by changing his action from xf to yf while
all other players continue to play according to x. Therefore, the function repre-
sents the sum of these improvements in payoﬀ. Note that the maximum value this
function can take, for a given x, is always nonnegative, owing to Result 3.1 above.
The function is everywhere non-positive when either x or y is a Nash equilibrium
point, since in an equilibrium situation no player can make any improvement to
their payoﬀ. Consequently, each summand in this case can be at most zero at the
Nash equilibrium point [13].
We observe that the “sum of improvements” in Ψ depends on the weighting
vector r = (rf)f∈F . Consequently, a manifold of equilibria indexed by r is expected
to exist. However, for a given r and diagonal strict concavity of
∑
f∈F rfφf(xf ),
uniqueness of equilibrium x∗ is guaranteed, see [19] and [7]. Also, notice that ac-
cording to Theorem 3.1 (the convergence theorem), if the assumptions are fulﬁlled,
then NIRA converges to the unique equilibrium, for the value of r that was used in
the deﬁnition of Ψ.
When the Nikaido-Isoda function cannot be made (signiﬁcantly) positive for a
given y, we have (approximately) reached the Nash equilibrium point. This obser-
vation is used to construct a termination condition for the relaxation algorithm,
which is used to min-maximise Ψ. An ε is chosen such that, when
max
y∈IRm
Ψ(xs,y) < ε, (8)
(where xs is the s-th iteration approximation of x∗) the Nash equilibrium would be
achieved to a suﬃcient degree of precision [13].
The Nikaido-Isoda function is used to construct the optimum response function.
This function is similar to the best response function in standard non-cooperative
game theory. It deﬁnes each player’s optimal action to maximise his payoﬀ given
what the other players have chosen. The vector Z(x) gives the ‘best move’ of each
player when faced with the collective action x. It is at this point that the coupled
constraints are introduced into the optimisation problem. The maximisation of the
Nikaido-Isoda function in equation (9) is performed subject to the constraints on
the players’ actions.
Definition 3.2. The optimum response function at point x is
Z(x) ∈ argmax
y∈X
Ψ(x,y). (9)
3.2.2 The relaxation algorithm
The relaxation algorithm iterates the function Ψ to ﬁnd the Nash equilibrium of a
game. It starts with an initial estimate of the Nash equilibrium and iterates from
that point towards Z(x) until no more improvement is possible. At such a point
every player is playing their optimum response to every other player’s action and the
Nash equilibrium is reached. The relaxation algorithm, when Z(x) is single-valued,
is
xs+1 = (1− αs)xs + αsZ(xs) 0 < αs ≤ 1 (10)
s = 0, 1, 2, . . .
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From the initial estimate, an iterate step s+1 is constructed by a weighted average
of the players’ improvement point Z(xs) and the current action point xs. Given
concavity assumptions explained in section 3.3, this averaging ensures convergence
(see [21], [13]) to the Nash equilibrium by the algorithm. By taking a suﬃcient
number of iterations of the algorithm, the Nash equilibrium x∗ can be determined
with a speciﬁed precision.
3.3 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points
It is one thing to know that one has a method to solve games with constraints
but, before proceeding, one needs to establish that the game has an equilibrium
at all. Furthermore, since the NIRA algorithm converges to a single equilibrium
point it would be nice if that equilibrium could be shown to be unique. The
conditions for existence and uniqueness for games with coupled constraints are
more intricate than those for games with uncoupled constraints. It is known that
every concave n-person game with uncoupled constraints has an equilibrium point
[19]. The equivalent deﬁnition for a game with coupled constraints relies upon the
notion of a weakly convex-concave function.
A weakly convex-concave function is a bivariate function that exhibits weak
convexity in its ﬁrst argument and weak concavity in its second argument. The
next three deﬁnitions (see [16] or [21]) formalise this notion.11 As Theorem 3.1
(the convergence theorem) will document, weak convex-concavity of a function is a
crucial assumption needed for convergence of a relaxation algorithm to a coupled
constraints equilibrium.
Let X be a convex closed subset of the Euclidean space IRm and f a continuous
function f : X → IR.
Definition 3.3. A function of one argument f(x) is weakly convex on X if there
exists a function r(x,y) such that ∀x,y ∈ X
αf(x) + (1− α)f(y) ≥ f(αx+ (1− α)y) + α(1− α)r(x,y) (11)
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and r(x,y)‖x−y‖ → 0 as ‖x− y‖ → 0 ∀x ∈ X.
Definition 3.4. A function of one argument f(x) is weakly concave on X if there
exists a function µ(x,y) such that, ∀x,y ∈ X
αf(x) + (1− α)f(y) ≤ f(αx+ (1− α)y) + α(1− α)µ(x,y) (12)
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and µ(x,y)‖x−y‖ → 0 as ‖x− y‖ → 0 ∀x ∈ X.
Example: The convex function f(x) = x2 is weakly concave (see [13]) but the convex
function f(x) = |x| is not.
Now take a bivariate function Ψ : X × X → IR deﬁned on a product X × X,
where X is a convex closed subset of the Euclidean space IRm.
11Recall the following elementary deﬁnition: a function is “just” convex ⇐⇒
αf(x) + (1− α)f(y) ≥ f
(
αx + (1− α)y
)
, α ∈ [0, 1].
9
Definition 3.5. A function of two vector arguments, Ψ(x,y) is referred to as
weakly convex-concave if it satisﬁes weak convexity with respect to its ﬁrst argument
and weak concavity with respect to its second argument.
The functions r(x,y; z) and µ(x,y; z) were introduced with the concept of weak
convex-concavity and are called the residual terms. Notice that smoothness of
Ψ(z,y) is not required. However, if Ψ(x,y) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable
with respect to both arguments on X ×X, the residual terms satisfy (see [13])
r(x,y;y) = 1
2
〈A(x,x)(x− y),x− y〉+ o1(‖x− y‖2) (13)
and
µ(y,x;x) = 1
2
〈B(x,x)(x− y),x− y〉+ o2(‖x− y‖2) (14)
where A(x,x) = Ψxx(x,y)|y=x is the Hessian of the Nikaido-Isoda function with
respect to the ﬁrst argument and B(x,x) = Ψyy(x,y)|y=x is the Hessian of the
Nikaido-Isoda function with respect to the second argument, both evaluated at
y = x.
To prove the inequality of condition (5) of Theorem 3.1 (the convergence theo-
rem, below) under the assumption that Ψ(x,y) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
it suﬃces to show that
Q(x,x) = A(x,x)− B(x,x) (15)
is strictly positive deﬁnite.
Theorem 3.1 (Convergence theorem). There exists a unique normalised Nash equi-
librium point to which the algorithm (10) converges if:
1. X is a convex, compact subset of IRm,
2. the Nikaido-Isoda function Ψ : X × X → IR is a weakly convex-concave
function and Ψ(x,x) = 0 for x ∈ X ,
3. the optimum response function Z(x) is single valued and continuous on X,
4. the residual term r(x,y; z) is uniformly continuous on X w.r.t. z for all
x,y ∈ X ,
5. the residual terms satisfy
r(x,y;y)− µ(y,x;x) ≥ β(‖x− y‖) , x,y ∈ X (16)
where β(0) = 0 and β is a strictly increasing function (i.e., β(t2) > β(t1) if
t2 > t1),
6. the relaxation parameters αs satisfy
• either (non-optimised step)
(a) αs > 0,
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(b)
∑∞
s=0 αs = ∞,
(c) αs → 0 as s →∞.
• or (optimised step)
αs = arg min
α∈[0,1)
{
max
y∈X
Ψ(x(s+1)(α),y)
}
. (17)
Proof. See [13] for a proof.
3.4 Enforcement through taxation
Once a CCE, x∗, has been computed it is possible to create an unconstrained
game which has x∗ as its solution by a simple modiﬁcation to the players’ payoﬀ
functions. For example, a regulator may compute that x∗ is the CCE of a game
involving the desired constraints on agents’ behaviour. He may then wish to induce
the players to arrive at this point through a scheme of taxation that modiﬁes their
payoﬀ functions. This can be achieved by the use of penalty functions that punish
players for breaching the coupled constraints.
Penalty functions are weighted by the Lagrange multipliers obtained from the
constrained game. For each constraint, players are taxed according to the function
T,f(λ, rf ,x) =
λ
rf
max(0, Q(x)−Q) (18)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the th constraint Q(x) may
be the amount of pollution as described by the left hand side of (4), or of the
transmitted power as in (3), while Q,  = 1, 2, . . . L denote the corresponding
limits (L is the total number of constraints); x is the vector of players’ actions, rf
is player f ’s weight that deﬁnes their responsibility for the constraints’ satisfaction.
If the weights r were identical [1 , 1 , . . .1] (see [3]) then the penalty term for
constraint  is the same for each player f
T,f(λ, 1,x) = λ max(0, Q(x)−Q) .
Hence, if the weight for player f is for example rf > 1 and the weights for the
other players were 1, 1,. . . 1, then the responsibility of player f for the constraints’
satisfaction is lessened. Obviously, if the players’ responsibilities are distributed
in periods t non-equally, then the weights, as well as the other variables, need the
other index t.
The players’ payoﬀ functions, so modiﬁed, will be
φ
f
(x) = Rf (x)− Cf (x)−
∑

Tf(λ, r,x) (19)
where Rf and Cf are ﬁrm f ’s revenue and cost functions respectively. Notice
that under this taxation scheme the penalties remain “nominal” (i.e., zero) if all
constraints are satisﬁed.
The Nash equilibrium of the new unconstrained game with payoﬀ functions φ
is implicitly deﬁned by the equation
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φ(x∗∗) = max
yf∈IR
+
φ(yf |x∗∗) ∀ f, (20)
(compare with equation (5)). For the setup of the problem considered in this paper
x∗ = x∗∗. That is, the CCE is equal to the unconstrained equilibrium with penalty
functions for breaches of the constraints, weighted by the Lagrange multipliers (see
[13], [10] and [11] for a more detailed discussion).
4 Case study
4.1 Without coupled constraints
The example is taken from [2] (originally, from [8]). Numerical data for the general
formulation of the problem is as follows. The period of study is split into two
sub-periods, weekdays and weekends, for which the demands for electricity are
diﬀerent. The periods account for 5 · 24 h=120 h and 2 · 24 h=48 h per week, or in
annual terms to 5/7 and 2/7 of the 365 · 24 = 8, 760 h of an entire year i.e., 6,257 h
and 2,503 h , respectively. These periods correspond to the two parts, into which
the load duration curve is divided. We assume that every hour within each period
is identical in terms of demand for energy, sales, power generations, etc.
There are three nodes, i = 1, 2, 3, each of which has customers. Generation
occurs only at nodes 1 and 2 and each pair of nodes is connected by a single
transmission line. The demand functions (per hour) are: in period 1, p1i (σ
1
i ) =
40 − 0.08σ1i , for nodes i = 1, 2 and p13(σ13) = 32 − 0.0516σ13 $/MWh for node 3;
in period 2, p2i (σ
2
i ) = 30 − 0.06σ2i , for nodes i = 1, 2 and p23(σ23) = 24 − 0.0387σ23
$/MWh for node 3. Thus, the demand is more elastic at the demand-only node 3.
Firm’s 1 generator is placed at i = 1 and ﬁrm’s 2 at i = 2. Since each ﬁrm has
only one generator we drop the i and g subscripts for brevity (e.g., P tfgi becomes
P tf). Both generators have unlimited capacity and constant marginal costs MC1 =
dC(P 11 )
dP 11
=
dC(P 21 )
dP 21
= 15 for ﬁrm 1 and MC2 =
dC(P 12 )
dP 12
=
dC(P 22 )
dP 22
= 20 for ﬁrm 2.
The marginal costs are measured in $/MWh. The three lines have equal impedances
of 0.2 p.u. The slack node is node 3.
Bearing in mind the general formulation of the generation game deﬁned by the
payoﬀs (1) and constraints (including coupled) (2)–(4) and the numerical values
for the problem parameters as above, both ﬁrms solve the following optimisation
problems:
Firm 1:
max
{
[40− 0.08σ11]s111 + [40− 0.08σ12]s112 + [32− 0.0516σ13]s113 − 15P 11 · 6, 257+
[30− 0.06σ21]s211 + [30− 0.06σ22]s212 + [24− 0.0387σ23]s213 − 15P 21 · 2, 503
}
(21)
Firm 2:
max
{
[40− 0.08σ11]s121 + [40− 0.08σ12]s122 + [32− 0.0516σ13]s123 − 20P 12 · 6, 257+
[30− 0.06σ21]s221 + [30− 0.06σ22]s222 + [24− 0.0387σ23]s223 − 20P 22 · 2, 503
}
(22)
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P 11∆
1 = s111 + s
1
12 + s
1
13, (23a)
P 21∆
1 = s211 + s
2
12 + s
2
13, (23b)
P 12∆
2 = s121 + s
1
22 + s
1
23, (23c)
P 22∆
2 = s221 + s
2
22 + s
2
23, (23d)
q11 = s
1
11 + s
1
21, (23e)
q21 = s
2
11 + s
2
21, (23f)
q12 = s
1
12 + s
1
22, (23g)
q22 = s
2
12 + s
2
22, (23h)
q13 = s
1
13 + s
1
23, (23i)
q23 = s
2
13 + s
2
23, (23j)
all s111, s
2
11, s
1
12, s
2
12, s
1
13, s
2
13, s
1
21, s
2
21, s
1
22, s
2
22, s
1
23, s
2
23,
P
1
1→2, P
2
1→2, P
1
1→3, P
2
1→3, P
1
2→3, P
2
2→3, nonnegative,
where the decision variables of the generators (ﬁrms) are: s111, s
2
11, s
1
12, s
2
12, s
1
13 and
s213 for the ﬁrst generator, and s
1
21, s
2
21, s
1
22, s
2
22, s
1
23 and s
2
23 for the second generator.
As in section 2.2, σti = q
t
i/∆
t.
The remaining variables are dependent on the decision variables. If the problem
involves constraints then part of the solution will constitute the Lagrange multi-
pliers that a regional regulator will be able to use to enforce the equilibrium (see
section 3.4).
4.2 Transmission line constraints
A constraint on transmission line capacity per period of the load duration curve
is imposed as described in equation (3).12 The equations of the constraints in this
example are
∣∣∣∣[Bd · AT · B−1] ·
(
P 11 − q11/∆1
P 12 − q12/∆1
)∣∣∣∣ ≤
⎛
⎜⎝ P
1
1→2
P
1
1→3
P
1
2→3
⎞
⎟⎠ . (25)
∣∣∣∣[Bd · AT · B−1] ·
(
P 21 − q21/∆2
P 22 − q22/∆2
)∣∣∣∣ ≤
⎛
⎜⎝ P
2
1→2
P
2
1→3
P
2
2→3
⎞
⎟⎠ . (26)
12For example, the ﬁrst row of P 1i→j is
P 11→2 = 0.66 s
1
12/∆
1 + 0.33 s113/∆
1 − 0.66 s121/∆1 − 0.33 s123/∆1. (24)
This indicates that the ﬂow along the line from node 1 to node 2 in period 1 depends not only
upon the quantity that is sold to nodes 1 and 2 but also upon the quantity of electricity that is
sold to node 3.
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The values of the transmission line constraints are as follows:
Bd =
⎛
⎝5 0 00 5 0
0 0 5
⎞
⎠ , A = ( 1 1 0−1 0 1
)
, B =
(
10 −5
−5 10
)
. (27)
Note that the ﬁrst row of matrix A (whose dimension is: 2 nodes times 3 lines)
expresses that node 1 is the starting node of lines 1–2 and 1–3, and the second row
means that node 2 is the ending node of line 1–2 and the starting node of line 2–3.
Node 3 is the slack node for which there are no calculations, since it is the reference
node.
The diagonal terms of B are computed as follows: b11 is the sum of the two line
susceptances connected to node 1, likewise for the other diagonal term correspond-
ing to node 2. The oﬀ-diagonal terms are the susceptances of the lines 1–2 and 2–1
(which is the same line), respectively.
Substituting the matrices in (27) into equations (25) and (26), and choosing
line limits (25, 200, 200)′, gives this numerical expression for the line constraints in
periods 1 and 2: ∣∣∣∣∣∣
⎛
⎝0.33 −0.330.66 0.33
0.33 0.66
⎞
⎠ · (P 11 − q11/∆1
P 12 − q12/∆1
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
⎛
⎝ 25200
200
⎞
⎠ . (28)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⎛
⎝0.33 −0.330.66 0.33
0.33 0.66
⎞
⎠ · (P 21 − q21/∆2
P 22 − q22/∆2
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
⎛
⎝ 25200
200
⎞
⎠ . (29)
P
t
1→3 and P
t
2→3 are set arbitrarily large such that they never bind. Because of
this, our problem can be considered to have only one coupled constraint on P t1→2.
Lagrange multipliers are only reported for this active constraint in the results below.
4.3 Environmental constraints
In this case study, an emission constraint is added to the problem formulation.
As a result, the problem is set as in (21)–(23), where both ﬁrms have the same
optimization functions as before, but, in this case, a new environmental constraint
is added to the constraint set (23), so that:
6, 257 · [(20− 0.4 · P 11 + 0.004 · (P 11 )2) + (22− 0.3 · P 12 + 0.005 · (P 12 )2)]+
2, 503 · [(20− 0.4 · P 21 + 0.004 · (P 21 )2) + (22− 0.3 · P 22 + 0.005 · (P 22 )2)] ≤ 2, 190, 000,
(30)
where the maximum allowed emission is 2,190,000 lb. Note13. that (30) is applied to
periods 1 and 2 simultaneously. Consequently, this constraint has a time coupling
eﬀect.
The annual emission limit assumes a constant hourly value of 250 lb/h that,
multiplied by 8,760 hours, results in 2,190,000 lb per year.
13We turn the reader’s attention to the fact that the function in expression (30) is quadratic
so, the second superindex means “square”.
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4.4 What kind of stylised situation reflects the model
Our ﬁrst generator is economically eﬃcient and has good ﬁlters. The other gener-
ator is “outdated” and does not have good ﬁlters. The transmission line between
the generators is due for an upgrade while the other lines are recently rebuilt and
have a high transmission capacity.
As judged by the nodal demand laws, the ﬁrst two nodes represent localities
with a mixture of industrial and domestic customers. The third node corresponds
to a township or a conglomerate of rural customers whose demand for electricity is
lower than in the ﬁrst two localities.
As said earlier, the demand functions change depending on the period. It is
assumed that the demand in weekdays (ﬁrst period) is higher than the demand on
weekends (second period).
The local regulator is concerned about pollution levels at some critical location
(like a National Park) where a monitor is installed. The monitor is capable of
detecting if the total annual pollution exceeds 2,190,000 lb, see condition (30).
Presumably, the coeﬃcients of the pollution function in this equation have been
calibrated to reﬂect the emissions’ transportation process from each generator to
the “critical” location.
The local environmental lobby group has managed to legislate that the limit of
K = 2, 190 klbs per year, measured at the “critical” location, has to be obeyed.
The local regulator considers an introduction of a pollution charge to be paid by
both generators should a violation of this constraint be detected.
The local regulator is interested to know what the generators’ reactions could
be should the pollution charge become a reality. In particular, the regulator would
like to know what energy prices can be expected after the introduction, whether
the energy supply might be aﬀected and in what way the region’s welfare may be
inﬂuenced. The results presented below provide some answers to these questions.
5 The first round’s results
5.1 Sharing the constraints’ burden in solidarity
We anticipate that, at realising what impact the constraints on the local econ-
omy might have (“ﬁrst round” - this section), the regulator will try and test some
measures to “save” the consumer surplus (“second round” - section 6).
As said earlier14, the generation game (21), (22), (23) (with constraints (28),(29)
and (30), if appropriate) satisﬁes the hypotheses of the convergence theorem (page
10) of the NIRA method. Consequently, we have used NIRA (see section 3.2)
to obtain the game’s solutions15 reported below. In the “ﬁrst round”, we set all
weights rtf ≡ 1 (commented on in footnote 10, page 7).
14See [2].
15We remind the reader that a solution (equilibrium) is a combination of the decision variables’
values such that the constraints are satisﬁed and no player is able to improve his payoﬀ by an
unilateral move.
15
5.2 Base case
The results of the application of NIRA to the game deﬁned by (21)–(23) are shown
in tables I and II. These and subsequent tables have three (or two) rows of results:
all ﬁrst row’s numbers concern the ﬁrst period, the second row’s refer to the second
period. The third row (if appropriate) provides the sums for both periods.
The energy demanded per node for the ﬁrst period is: 1,173.18 GWh, 1,173.18
GWh, and 1,172.18 GWh and for the second period, 347.64 GWh, 347.64 GWh,
and 291.05 GWh. As expected, the “weekend” demand is lower than the weekdays’;
also, the third node (“rural”) consumes less energy than the other nodes.
Prices at the nodes, according to the linear demand functions, are: 25, 25, and
22.3 $/MWh for the ﬁrst period and 21.66, 21.66 and 19.5 $MWh for the second
period.
The ﬂows’ absolute values per hour through the lines are: 73.96 MW, 130.65
MW, and 56.7 MW for lines 1–2, 1–3 and 2–3, in the ﬁrst period and 94.31 MW,
105.29 MW, and 10.98 MW for lines 1–2, 1–3 and 2–3 in the second period.
Proﬁts for the ﬁrst period for ﬁrms 1 and 2 are 22.16 M$ and 4.57 M$, re-
spectively; for the second period, they are 5.02 M$ and 232 k$, respectively. As
expected, the ﬁrst generator produces substantially more than the second. Total
pollution is 4,627 klb. As no constraints are active the Lagrange multipliers for
the line and environmental constraints are: λ1L1 = λ
2
L1 = λE = 0 (notice that we
do not index λE with time because this Lagrange multiplier corresponds to the
intertemporary constraint (30)).
Table I: Sales, generation and total emissions in the base case
Sales by Firm 1
(1000MWh)
Sales by Firm 2
(1000MWh)
Generation by
Firms
(1000MWh)
Emissions by
Firms (1000lb)
st11 s
t
12 s
t
13 s
t
21 s
t
22 s
t
23 P
t
1∆
t P t2∆
t Et1 E
t
2
782.12 782.12 889.24 391.06 391.06 282.94 2453.5 1065.1 2992 724.6
278.11 278.11 291.05 69.53 69.53 0 847.3 139.1 858.4 52
1060.24 1060.24 1180.3 460.6 460.6 282.94 3300.8 1204.2 3850.4 776.6
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Table II: Economics of generation in the base case per hour per period
Demand (MW) Prices ($/MWh) Proﬁts ($/h)
σt1 σ
t
2 σ
t
3 p
t
1 p
t
2 p
t
3 Π1 Π2
187.5 187.5 187.34 25 25 22.33 3542.2 730.51
138.89 138.89 116.28 21.66 21.66 19.5 2004.8 92.7
Flows for lines (MW) Lagrange multipliers Emission levels (lb/h)
1 – 2 1− 3 2− 3 λt
T
λ
E
Firm1 Firm2 Total
73.96 130.65 56.69 - - 478.18 115.81 593.99
94.31 105.29 10.98 - - 342.93 20.76 363.7
5.3 Generation under a transmission constraint
For this example, a limit of 25 MW in the transmission capacity of the line that
connects nodes 1 and 2 is imposed. As a result, the problem is set as in section 5.2
above with the addition of the constraints described in equations (25) and (26).
This generation game is a game with coupled constraints, among two non iden-
tical players (player 1 produces electricity more cheaply than player 2). From the
results on ﬂows shown in table II we expect the constraints (28), (29) will be bind-
ing.
The results of the relaxation algorithm are shown in tables III and IV. The
energy demanded per node for the ﬁrst period is: 1,245.8 GWh, 1,100.5 GWh, and
1,172.2 GWh and for the second period, 391.3 GWh, 303.9 GWh, and 280.3 GWh.
Table III: Generation and sales with a line ﬂow limit of 25 MW in line 1–2
Sales by Firm 1
(1000MWh)
Sales by Firm 2
(1000MWh)
Generation by
Firms
(1000MWh)
Emissions by
Firms (1000lb)
st11 s
t
12 s
t
13 s
t
21 s
t
22 s
t
23 P
t
1∆
t P t2∆
t Et1 E
t
2
709.47 636.82 720.28 536.37 463.72 451.9 2066.6 1452 2028.7 1386.8
234.41 190.72 200.2 156.92 113.22 80.06 625.3 350.2 424.8 195
943.89 827.54 920.48 693.29 576.94 531.96 2691.9 1802.2 2453.5 1581.8
Prices at the nodes are: 24.1, 25.9, and 22.3 $/MWh for the ﬁrst period and
20.6, 22.7 and 19.6 $/MWh for the second period. The ﬂows’ absolute values per
hour through the lines are: 25 MW, 106.17 MW, and 81.17 MW for lines 1–2, 1–3
and 2–3, in the ﬁrst period and 25 MW, 68.5 MW, and 43.5 MW for lines 1–2,
1–3 and 2–3 in the second period. We notice that the line constraint is binding
and that most prices are higher for this constrained generation case than for the
previous one when no constraint was imposed.
Proﬁts for the ﬁrst period for ﬁrms 1 and 2 are 18.67 M$ and 5.98 M$, re-
spectively; for the second period, they are 3.72 M$ and 378 k$, respectively. To-
tal pollution is 4,035 klb. The Lagrange multipliers for the line constraints are:
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λ1L1 = 26.16; λ
2
L1 = 11.8; the environmental constraint is not imposed hence.
λE = 0. Interestingly, the total energy generation is comparable between this
and this previous cases; however, ﬁrm 2 produces now more than before, hence its
marked share has increased.
Table IV: Economics of generation per hour per period with a line ﬂow limit of 25
MW in line 1–2
Demand (MW) Prices ($/MWh) Proﬁts ($/h)
σt1 σ
t
2 σ
t
3 p
t
1 p
t
2 p
t
3 Π1 Π2
199.11 175.89 187.34 24.07 25.93 22.33 2985.04 956.90
156.35 121.43 111.97 20.62 22.71 19.67 1487.42 151.02
Flows for lines (MW) Lagrange multipliers Emission levels (lb/h)
1 – 2 1− 3 2− 3 λt
T
λ
E
Firm1 Firm2 Total
25 106.17 81.17 26.16 - 324.23 221.64 545.87
25 68.49 43.49 11.8 - 169.73 77.91 247.64
5.4 Generation under an environmental constraint
The regulator will also be interested to see in what way the generators’ behaviour
would change if the environmental constraint (30) was introduced (and the trans-
mission line upgraded so that the line constraint became non-binding). The results
obtained are shown in tables V and VI.
Table V: Generation and sales with an emission constraint
Sales by Firm 1
(1000MWh)
Sales by Firm 2
(1000MWh)
Generation by
Firms
(1000MWh)
Emissions by
Firms (1000lb)
st11 s
t
12 s
t
13 s
t
21 s
t
22 s
t
23 P
t
1∆
t P t2∆
t Et1 E
t
2
574.62 574.62 567.53 347.34 347.34 215.16 1716.8 909.8 1322.6 526.2
182.92 182.92 154.24 87.86 87.86 6.86 520.1 182.6 274.3 66.9
757.55 757.55 721.78 435.2 435.2 222.02 2236.9 1092.4 1596.9 593.1
The energy demanded per node for the ﬁrst period is: 921.9 GWh, 921.9 GWh,
and 782.7 GWh and for the second period, 270.7 GWh, 270.7 GWh, and 161.1
GWh. Prices at the nodes are: 28.2, 28.2 and 25.5 $/MWh for the ﬁrst period and
23.5, 23.5 and 21.5 $MWh for the second period. We notice that the prices rose
even higher than under the transmission constraint.
The ﬂows’ absolute values per hour through the lines are: 42.98 MW, 84.04
MW, and 41.05 MW for lines 1–2, 1–3 and 2–3, in the ﬁrst period and 44.94 MW,
54.66 MW, and 9.71 MW for lines 1–2, 1–3 and 2–3 in the second period.
Proﬁts for the ﬁrst period for ﬁrms 1 and 2 are 21.17 M$ and 6.89 M$, respec-
tively; for the second period, they are 4.11 M$ and 627 k$, respectively. Total
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Table VI: Economics of generation per hour per period with an emission constraint
Demand (MW) Prices ($/MWh) Proﬁts ($/h)
σt1 σ
t
2 σ
t
3 p
t
1 p
t
2 p
t
3 Π1 Π2
147.35 147.35 125.09 28.21 28.21 25.54 3383.25 1102.44
108.18 108.18 64.36 23.51 23.51 21.51 1644.83 250.5
Flows for lines (MW) Lagrange multipliers Emission levels (lb/h)
1 – 2 1− 3 2− 3 λt
T
λ
E
Firm1 Firm2 Total
42.99 84.04 41.05 - - 211.38 84.1 295.48
44.95 54.66 9.71 - 0.0033 109.58 26.72 136.3
pollution is 2,190.0 klb. The Lagrange multipliers for the environmental constraint
is: λE = 0.0033. Also in this constrained generation game, ﬁrm 2’s production levels
increase above the no constrained game’s; as a result its market share increases.
5.5 Generation under transmission and environmental con-
straints
In this case study, both the 25 MW thermal limit of line 1–2 (equations (25) and
(26)) and the emission constraints (equation (30)) are added to the basic problem
formulation.
The results obtained are shown in tables VII and VIII. The energy demanded
per node for the ﬁrst period is: 989.1 GWh, 883 GWh, and 804.6 GWh and for the
second period, 301.1 GWh, 247.4 GWh, and 166.5 GWh.
Prices at the nodes, according to the linear demand functions, are: 27.35, 28.71
and 25.36 $/MWh for the ﬁrst period and 22.78, 24.07 and 21.43 $MWh for the
second period. The ﬂows’ absolute values per hour through the lines are: 25 MW,
76.79 MW, and 51.79 MW for lines 1–2, 1–3 and 2–3, in the ﬁrst period and 25
MW, 45.76 MW, and 20.76 MW for lines 1–2, 1–3 and 2–3 in the second period.
Table VII: Generation and sales with a line ﬂow limit of 25 MW in line 1–2 and an
emission constraint
Sales by Firm 1
(1000MWh)
Sales by Firm 2
(1000MWh)
Generation by
Firms
(1000MWh)
Emissions by
Firms (1000lb)
st11 s
t
12 s
t
13 s
t
21 s
t
22 s
t
23 P
t
1∆
t P t2∆
t Et1 E
t
2
575.62 522.54 527.93 413.54 360.46 276.65 1626.1 1050.7 1165.1 704.6
184.59 157.69 135.98 116.56 89.67 30.52 478.3 236.8 224.3 96
760.21 680.24 663.92 530.11 450.14 307.17 2104.4 1287.5 1389.4 800.6
Proﬁts for the ﬁrst period for ﬁrms 1 and 2 are 19.74 M$ and 7.66 M$, respec-
tively; for the second period, they are 3.74 M$ and 733 k$, respectively. Total
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pollution is 2,190 klb. The Lagrange multipliers for the line and environmental
constraints are: λ1L1 = 19.11; λ
2
L1 = 7.26;λE = 0.003.
Table VIII: Economics of generation per hour per period with a line ﬂow limit of
25 MW in line 1–2 and an emission constraint
Demand (MW) Prices ($/MWh) Proﬁts ($/h)
σt1 σ
t
2 σ
t
3 p
t
1 p
t
2 p
t
3 Π1 Π2
158.09 141.12 128.59 27.35 28.71 25.36 3155.98 1225.02
120.31 98.82 66.52 22.78 24.07 21.43 1494.2 292.85
Flows for lines (MW) Lagrange multipliers Emission levels (lb/h)
1 – 2 1− 3 2− 3 λt
T
λ
E
Firm1 Firm2 Total
25 76.79 51.79 19.11 - 186.21 112.6 298.81
25 45.76 20.76 7.26 0.003 89.61 38.36 127.97
5.6 First round’s discussion
We notice that the imposition of constraints favours the second generator in that
its share of production increases, see ﬁgure 1. The symbols in the ﬁgure correspond
to the above four cases as follows:
1. square – no constraints (section 5.2);
2. diamond – transmission line constraint (section 5.3);
3. pentagram – environmental constraint (section 5.4);
4. hexagram – the two constraints jointly (section 5.5).
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Figure 1: Generations (in MWh) in periods 1 and 2.
All lines in ﬁgure 1 are angled at 45o. The solid ones go through the origin. If
the generators were identical, the constraints would aﬀect each them in the same
way and the generation points would be on this line. Obviously, the generators
in the case study are not identical. However, imposition of a constraint blurs the
diﬀerence. This is visible from the diminishing distances of the generation points
from the 45o line, after a constraint imposition.
The dash-dotted lines pass through the unconstrained generation point (square).
They are drawn to help assess the distance of each generation point from the 45o
line.
The overall result is that the constrained generation games result in the ﬁrm
2’s (the less eﬃcient one) gains of the market. This can be qualiﬁed as market dis-
tortion. However, when a transmission constraint is the only model restriction, the
distortion concerns the generators rather than consumers. In case of the imposi-
tion of an environmental constraint (sole or joint with a transmission constraint) the
prices rise substantially and the consumers surplus is diminished. We will comment
on this issue later in section 7.1.
We conjecture that the market distortion due to constraints is unavoidable. If
a line constraint is imposed on the ﬂow through link 1–2, then (24) (in footnote
12) has to be satisﬁed. It is evident from (24) that, for this to happen, the sales by
ﬁrm 2 at nodes one and two have to increase and those of ﬁrm 1 have to decrease.
This explains the generation changes (in ﬁgure 1 from square to diamond) when a
line constraint is imposed.
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We can also observe the generation changes due to the imposition of an envi-
ronmental constraint. In ﬁgure 1, the outputs “move” from square to pentagram.
Generation by ﬁrm 1 diminishes substantially while that by ﬁrm 2 can increase (in
period 2) or decrease a little (in period 1). In each period ﬁrm 2’s market share is
greater than in the unconstrained case.
We observe in ﬁgure 2 that imposing a constraint changes the proportions, in
which the ﬁrms contribute to the total pollution. In this ﬁgure, each bar repre-
sents the total pollution corresponding to the base game, transmission-constraint
game (tc), environmental-constraint game (ec) and transmission-&-environmental-
constraint game (tcec), respectively. The two bottom ﬁelds symbolise the ﬁrst
period’s pollution by ﬁrm 1 (bottom) and 2; the two top ﬁelds represent the second
period’s pollution by ﬁrm 2 (top) and 1.
0
1000
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5000
Total Pollution
base tcectc ec
Figure 2: Total pollution in 1000lb.
The contributions are functions of the generation, see ﬁgure 3.
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Figure 3: Firms’ emissions as functions of hourly generations.
Given that ﬁrm 1 is more environmentally friendly (i.e., it emits less per unit
of generation) it could be expected that, as the environmental constraint tightens,
ﬁrm 1’s market share would increase. However, this is not what we observe in
ﬁgure 1. As the environmental constraint is tightened, with or without a binding
line constraint, the market share of the environmentally ineﬃcient ﬁrm 2 increases.
We conjecture that the source of this apparent anomaly are changes in the eﬀective
marginal costs TMCf under the imposition of constraints. In words, the ﬁrm’s
eﬀective marginal cost is MCf
(
where MCf is ﬁrm’s f marginal cost
dC(Pf)
dPf
)
plus the marginal cost of the pollution constraints’ violation. Under the constraint
imposition we have16
MC1
MC2
<
TMC1
TMC2
< 1 . (31)
In broad terms, there is less diﬀerence between the ﬁrms when a constraint is
binding hence the outputs’ ratio “must” move closer to the 45o line in ﬁgure 1.
Not surprisingly, if generation diminishes because of a constraint, the pollution
diminishes too. Because of that, when contributions of ﬁrm 1 diminish, the relative
contributions of ﬁrm 2 increase.
Overall, the result of the constraints’ imposition is market distortion (see ﬁgure
1), more pollution coming form the less eﬃcient ﬁrm (see ﬁgure 2) and higher
energy prices (see the tables above). There are also signiﬁcant imbalances between
the weekdays and weekends pollution contributions.
16See [12].
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The above analysis motivates the regulator to design and solve other generation
games in which the weights rtf (see section 3.2, footnote 10) will modify players’
eﬃcient marginal costs so that the resulting equilibria will be “socially” more ac-
ceptable.
6 The second round’s results
6.1 How to “improve” results?
The games’ solutions will be obtained in this section for various weights rtf >
0, f = 1, 2; t = 1, 2 (i.e., not all rtf = 1). The non identical weights will be used to
help modify the players’ eﬃcient marginal costs in an attempt to achieve equilibria,
socially more attractive than in section 5.
Accepting any set of weights rtf , including r
t
f ≡ 1, requires a political decision
that is about the levels of responsibility for the common constraints’ satisfaction. In
particular, if all weights are set to 1, then the burden of the constraints’ satisfaction
is shared equally.
We have seen in section 5 that rtf ≡ 1 leads to equilibria that display several
undesirable social characteristics. It is therefore conceivable that the regulator
might be given a mandate (by the local parliament) to seek “better” equilibria,
associated with an unequal treatment of the generators.
We will examine in this section whether it is possible for the regulator to dimin-
ish ﬁrm 2’s market share gains and mitigate the emissions’ asymmetry between the
weekends and weekdays generations. We will also watch whether these solutions
will result in lower prices for the consumers and, hence, higher consumers surplus
than in section 5.
6.2 Generation under transmission and environmental con-
straints with preferences for pollution in the second
period
An analysis of the results of section 5.5 concludes that due to a decreased economic
activity in the second period, the pollution stock generated by the weekdays’ output
exceeds the weekend’s stock more that ﬁve times. Consequently, the emission ﬂows
substantially diﬀer between weekdays and weekends. While the overall pollution
constraint (30) remains satisﬁed, the heavy ﬂow on weekdays might create some
health hazards. Also, the fact that it is rather uneconomical to sell electricity on
weekends in the “rural” area can cause social problems.
We will examine whether the regulator can compute an equilibrium where there
would be more production on weekends. We will set the weights r21=100 and r
2
2=100
and keep r1f = 1, f = 1, 2. The results obtained are shown in tables IX and X are
visualized in ﬁgure 4.
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Table IX: Generation and sales with a line ﬂow limit of 25 MW in line 1–2 and an
emission constraint with preferences for the second period
Sales by Firm 1
(1000MW)
Sales by Firm 2
(1000MW)
Generation by
Firms
(1000MW)
Emissions by
Firms (1000lb)
st11 s
t
12 s
t
13 s
t
21 s
t
22 s
t
23 P
t
1 P
t
2 E
t
1 E
t
2
541.46 496.28 481.09 383.83 338.65 236.71 1518.8 959.2 992.35 585.12
233.47 190.01 198.93 156.11 112.65 78.99 622.4 347.8 420.19 192.33
774.94 686.29 680.02 539.95 451.31 315.71 2141.3 1307 1412.55 777.45
Table X: Economics of generation per hour per period with a line ﬂow limit of 25
MW in line 1–2 and an emission constraint with preferences for the second period
Demand (MW) Prices ($/MWh) Proﬁts ($/h)
σt1 σ
t
2 σ
t
3 p
t
1 p
t
2 p
t
3 Π1 Π2
147.88 133.43 114.72 28.17 29.32 26.08 3127.85 1235.89
155.64 120.92 111.03 20.66 22.74 19.7 1489.81 155.41
Flows for lines (MW) Lagrange multipliers Emission levels (lb/h)
1 – 2 1− 3 2− 3 λt
T
λ
E
Firm1 Firm2 Total
25 69.86 44.86 16.26 - 158.6 93.51 252.11
25 68.02 43.02 1173.4 0.0041 167.87 76.84 244.71
The energy demanded per node for the ﬁrst period is: 925.3 GWh, 834.9 GWh,
and 717.8 GWh and for the second period, 389.6 GWh, 302.7 GWh, and 277.9
GWh. We notice that demand in the ﬁrst period decreased and increased in period
two.
The corresponding prices at the nodes are: 28.17, 29.32 and 26.08 $/MWh for
the ﬁrst period and 20.66, 22.74 and 19.7 $MWh for the second period. It is evident
that the adopted weights helped ease the second period prices (compare the prices
in table VIII).
The ﬂows’ absolute values per hour through the lines are: 25 MW, 69.9 MW,
and 44.9 MW for lines 1–2, 1–3 and 2–3, in the ﬁrst period and 25 MW, 68 MW,
and 43 MW for lines 1–2, 1–3 and 2–3 in the second period. Proﬁts for the ﬁrst
period for ﬁrms 1 and 2 are 19.57 M$ and 7.73 M$, respectively; for the second
period, they are 3.72 M$ and 389 k$, respectively.
The Lagrange multipliers for the line and environmental constraints are: λ1L1 =
16.26; λ2L1 = 1173.4;λE = 0.0041.
Total pollution is kept at the constraint and equals 2,190.0 klb. As expected,
the pollution in the second period has increased. The pollution changes between
periods are presented in ﬁgure 4. In this ﬁgure as in ﬁgure 2, the bars represent the
total pollution levels corresponding to the transmission-&-environmental-constraint
game with r2f = 1 (ﬁrst bar) and r
2
f = 100 (second bar). The two bottom ﬁelds
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together symbolise the ﬁrst period’s pollution by ﬁrm 1 (bottom) and 2; the two
top ﬁelds together represent the second period’s pollution by ﬁrm 2 (top) and 1.
The pollution in period one has clearly diminished so has the contribution of ﬁrm
2 (“ineﬃcient”). However, we also notice that this equilibrium is achieved with
higher prices than before thus the consumers surplus is bound to diminish.
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f
2
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Period Second
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Period
First
Period
Figure 4: Total pollution in 1000lb as a function of the weights rt.
We attribute the shift in generations between the ﬁrst and second periods to the
weights > 1 attached to payoﬀs in the second period. This means that, because of
r21=100 and r
2
2=100, the ﬁrms perceive the marginal cost of violating the environ-
mental constraint in period 2 as
λE
100
(βf + 2γfP
2
f ), rather than as λE(βf + 2γfP
1
f )
in the ﬁrst period.
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6.3 Generation under transmission and environmental con-
straints with preference for the first firm
We will examine whether the regulator can compute an equilibrium where there
would be more production assigned to player 1. We will set the weights r11 = r
2
1=100
for player 1 and keep r12 = r
2
2=1 for player 2. The results obtained are shown in
tables XI and XII. We can observe that the proﬁts have dramatically decreased for
ﬁrm 2 in both periods.
Table XI: Generation and sales with with preference for the ﬁrst ﬁrm
Sales by Firm 1
(1000MWh)
Sales by Firm 2
(1000MWh)
Generation by
Firms
(1000MWh)
Emissions by
Firms (1000lb)
st11 s
t
12 s
t
13 s
t
21 s
t
22 s
t
23 P
t
1∆
t P t2∆
t Et1 E
t
2
395.8 698.9 674.2 801.4 0 0 1769 801.4 1418 410.5
142.6 218.2 166 207.2 0 0 526.8 207.3 282.8 78.7
538.4 917.1 840.2 1008.7 0 0 2295.8 1008.7 1700.8 489.2
Table XII: Economics of generation per hour per period with preference for the ﬁrst
ﬁrm
Demand (MW) Prices ($/MWh) Proﬁts ($/h)
σt1 σ
t
2 σ
t
3 p
t
1 p
t
2 p
t
3 Π1 Π2
191.33 111.7 107.75 24.69 31.06 26.44 3640.24 601.08
139.8 87.17 66.32 21.61 24.77 21.43 1654.81 133.44
Flows for lines (MW) Lagrange multipliers Emission levels (lb/h)
1 – 2 1− 3 2− 3 λt
T
λ
E
Firm1 Firm2 Total
25 66.37 41.37 2342.3 - 226.63 65.59 292.22
25 45.65 20.65 505.9 0.2 112.98 31.44 144.42
The energy demanded per node for the ﬁrst period is: 1,197.2 GWh, 698.9
GWh, and 674.2 GWh and for the second period, 349.9 GWh, 218.2 GWh, and 166
GWh.
However, prices are hight. They are (at nodes 1, 2 and 3): 24.69, 31.06 and
26.44 $/MWh for the ﬁrst period and 21.61, 24.77 and 21.43 $MWh for the second
period. We will analyse the shifts in the consumers surplus for this and other cases
in section 7.1.
The ﬂows’ absolute values per hour through the lines are: 25 MW, 66.37 MW,
and 41.37 MW for lines 1–2, 1–3 and 2–3, in the ﬁrst period and 25 MW, 45.65
MW, and 20.65 MW for lines 1–2, 1–3 and 2–3 in the second period.
Proﬁts for the ﬁrst period for ﬁrms 1 and 2 are 22.77 M$ and 3.76 M$, re-
spectively; for the second period, they are 4.14 M$ and 334 k$, respectively (as
opposed to M$ 19.74, 7.66, 3.74 and .733, respectively, for rtf ≡ 1, see section
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5.5). The Lagrange multipliers for the line and environmental constraints are:
λ1L1 = 2342.3; λ
2
L1 = 505.9;λE = 0.2.
Total pollution is equal to the upper bound, 2,190.0 klb.
The eﬀect of incentivizing production of ﬁrm 1 is clearly observed in ﬁgure 5
where the pollution levels of ﬁrm 1 in both periods are substantially higher than in
the case with all rf = 1 (see the bottom bar and the second from the top for ﬁrst
and second period, respectively; notice that the bars do not start from zero).
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Figure 5: Total pollution in 1000lb as a function of the weights rt.
7 What can the regulator learn from the above
results
7.1 Implications for producer profits and consumer surplus
Figure 6 shows the plots of producer proﬁts and consumer surplus (top and bottom
respectively) as the constraints vary.17
17Producer proﬁts (or producer surplus) are calculated from equation (1). Consumer surplus is
CS =
∑N
i=1
q∗i
2 (ai − p∗i ) where q∗i and p∗i are the equilibrium quantity and price at node i and ai
is the price intercept of the demand curve.
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Figure 6: Producers’ proﬁts and consumers’ surplus in M$.
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There are six bars in each of the panels of ﬁgure 6 for the cases as follows:
1. the base case,
2. generation subject to transmission constraints,
3. generation subject to emission constraints,
4. generation subject to both constraints,
5. generation subject to both constraints with preferences for pollution in the
second period,
6. generation subject to both constraints with preference for the ﬁrst ﬁrm.
We observe that the eﬀect of a transmission constraint is negligible in terms of con-
sumers surplus because prices and overall demands remain fairly stable. However,
it diminishes producers proﬁts because of the 25 MW limit imposed, specially on
the more eﬃcient/cheaper ﬁrm 1.
The introduction of an emission constraint introduces higher prices. This causes
consumers surplus to substantially decrease and producers proﬁts to increase. If
both constraints are imposed simultaneously the emission limit eﬀect surpasses that
of the line limit by far so, this case is almost equivalent to the emission-limit-alone
case.
If production in period 2 is incentivized, prices increase in period 1 and decrease
in period 2 making consumers surplus decrease in period 1 and increase in period 2.
Producers proﬁts remain almost the same since there is a small shift of generation
between periods 1 and 2.
Finally, if production of ﬁrm 1 is incentivized the eﬀects on both the producers
proﬁts and the consumers surplus appear clear but rather small. We notice the
overall decrease in the producer proﬁts and an increase in the consumers surplus.
The absolute sizes of those changes relative to case 4 depend on the parameter
values chosen for this case study. Hence, notwithstanding the small changes, the
regulator might be pleased that the consumers surplus improves when ﬁrm 1 is
incentivized.
7.2 Results of varying the “sharing rules”
The results obtained for the case study indicate that the regulator can impact the
producer proﬁts and consumer surplus by imposing diﬀerent levels of the respon-
sibility for the joint constraints’ satisfaction. In other words, varying the rules
for how the burden of the environmental and transmission standards’ fulﬁlment is
shared among the producers can generate a number of equilibria of uneven social
desirability. The implication of this is that a desired equilibrium can be chosen.
8 Concluding remarks
We have proposed a methodology for the analysis of the impact of various con-
straints on electricity generation. In particular, this analysis should be useful for a
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regional government that is interested in an assessment of electricity supply changes
due to an introduction of environmental constraints. For the case study considered
in the paper, we notice the possibility of some market distortion when transmission
constraints exist.
Introduction of an environmental constraint, which many businesses fear, may
actually increase the business proﬁts and make the consumers worse oﬀ economi-
cally.
We believe that thanks to our analysis, the regional government’s choices will
be informed by the tradeoﬀs between constraint satisfaction, economic activity and
electricity supply.
In the next paper we plan to extend the analysis to include the optimal choice
of environmental constraints.
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